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Robert Denoon Cumming. Starting Point: An Introduction to the Dialectic of Existence.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. xv + 579 $35.00.
This is a book of the first importance. First, it is a daring attempt to rethink the existential
dialectic practiced by Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Heidegger and it offers a rigorous and sustained
reading of some of their major texts. Second, it is also an example of a dialectical approach to
writing philosophical history. Cumming, in this book, is a dialectician who distinguishes his
dialectic from Hegel's (as do the thinkers he discusses) by insisting that an existential dialectic is
open-ended, involves elements of dislocation, and will never culminate in a final synthesis.
Cumming's dialectic is also to be differentiated from the Hegelian by its rejection of the notion
of an absolute starting point. So Starting Point does not begin with the sense-certainty of the
Phenomenology or with the Sein of the Logic but with a consideration of what it means to
identify something as a philosophical movement. Cumming stresses the personal, social, and
ontological senses of movement; he dislocates the expectations conventionally raised by his title
by denying that there is any starting point other than the personal, understood in a sense which
includes Kierkegaard's "that individual" and early Heidegger's stress on the Jemeinigkeit of
Dasein. But, in contrast to the popular understanding of existentialism (which can find some
support in a text such as Sartre's "Existentialism is a Humanism"), Cumming makes it clear that
the starting point is not immediately available or obvious. To be at any starting point is to have a
specific history involving dislocation and a struggle with self-deception. Human existence is to
be understood in Heidegger's sense of Wiederholung as a constant attempt to come to terms with
one's own historicity. To do that is to become aware of the stages or levels of human existence,
as in Kierkegaard's or Sartre's analyses. Since Cumming rejects not only foundationalism but
also the typical Anglo-American assumption of a clearcut distinction between philosophical
principles and philosophical examples, he proceeds not by abstracting from his authors but by
means of a close reading of their texts which includes an awareness of how they read one
another.
Yet in a brief review it is impossible to capture the concreteness characteristic of
Cumming's interrogation of particular texts and his assessments of individual thinkers. Among
the distinctive themes which emerge, I will mention only two: spatiality and the confrontation
with Hegel.
Spatiality: One traditional way of understanding continental philosophy, and in fact of
establishing it as a tradition, is to see it as either moving back and forth between or combining
Kant's emphasis on the temporality of human experience with Hegel's insight into its historical
character. Cumming is aware of the truth of this view, but he believes that an existential dialectic
also involves the sense both of site and place and of dislocation and disjunction (see chapter 3,
"The Dislocated World"). He quotes Heidegger: "Dasein takes up space, and this is to be
understood literally" (103). In developing a spatial thematics Cumming himself juxtaposes
(through what he called a topological method in his first book, Human Nature and History) such
topoi as Heideggerian Entfernung, Sartre's elucidation of the distance between the self and the
other, and Kierkegaard's adaptation of Trendelenburg's critique of Hegel on the starting point: it
must be real movement in space, not the abstract movement of the concept. Perhaps Cumming
would like to follow the existentialists in spatializing time in a certain sense; however this is not
done in the spirit which Bergson attributed to the tradition but as a way of preserving both a
sense of genuine change and of places or "stages on life's way." Those who accept the one
somewhat disingenuous statement in this book ("I have tried to write too for those not previously

exposed," ix), will want to approach dislocation by means of Cumming's chapter on "The
Wiggling Bottom," which glosses Sartre's attention to spatial movement.
Hegel. It is not unusual to present existentialism as involving and even generating itself
by means of a critique of Hegel. What is distinctive about Cumming's book here comes from his
insistence that to understand existential dialectic we must see that the manner of writing or
speaking, the form of communication is not just important but precisely what is at stake in
existential philosophy. One sometimes finds such awareness of philosophy as a mode of
discourse in English language discussions of Kierkegaard's indirect communication or of
Nietzsche, a writer dismissed here for being overly biologistic, but Cumming has attempted to
give a sustained account of all existential dialectic as a distinctive approach to discourse. As
such, its great other is the Hegelian claim to absolute knowledge, to a universal language of an
enlightened community based on full mutual recognition and self-knowledge. From a critical
point of view, then, the crux of Hegelian philosophy (non-existential dialectic) is the transition
from the aesthetic to the philosophical, which involves the claim that the apparent multiplicity
and irreducibility of the artistic find their truth in the conceptual totality of absolute knowledge.
It is at this reflective, meta philosophical level that Cumming sees Kierkegaard paradigmatically,
but Sartre and Heidegger too, as shaping their own discourses which involve dislocating some
rationalist contrasts between the philosophical and the poetic or rhetorical. Cumming gives a
close reading of Kierkegaard's Either/Or as a critique of the system of Hegelian aesthetics and as
a demonstration of Hegel's attempted escape from the rough edges of existence by a Schein
which renders his own philosophy merely aesthetic. The title of the most relevant chapter here,
"Finish" (ch. 11 ), refers to an ambiguity between an artistic or craftsmanlike final coat which
preserves a work and makes it shine forth, and Hegel's claim to have brought philosophy to an
end. Cumming reads Kierkegaard on the aphoristic versus the finished in relation to Hegel on the
finish of the masterpieces of European painting as anticipating the luminosity of a completed
philosophy. The reading, as usual, is somewhat dislocating, but grounded in both hermeneutic
rigor and linguistic sensitivity.
Cumming complicates his Starting Point by promising that it is to be followed by a
second book which will offer an account of phenomenology, especially as practiced by Husserl
and Merleau-Ponty, from the standpoint of an existential dialectic. He justifies this reversal of
the more usual expository order in which phenomenology precedes existentialism by citing the
quirkiness of philosophical history in which English speaking readers have in fact generally been
introduced to continental thinkers in this recapitulative, wiederholend manner. But I wonder
whether a second volume alone can do justice to Cumming's ambitious attempt to clarify the
nature of philosophy by means of existential reflection on ways of starting and ways of speaking.
Noticeable in Cumming's topics, in his tone, and in his style of rigorous commentary and
startling juxtaposition are some deep affinities with such post-existential writers as Derrida or
Foucault. We should hope then not only to be able to read Cumming soon on the classical
phenomenological line but also that he will eventually explain whether and how an existential
dialectic differs from a philosophy of deconstruction and difference, to which it seems very close
in the present book.
Gary Shapiro, University of Kansas

